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Simplifying network security data to the point that it is readily accessible and
usable by a wider audience is increasingly becoming important, as networks become
larger and security conditions and threats become more dynamic and complex, requiring
a broader and more varied security staff makeup. With the need for a simple metric to
quantify the security level on a network, this thesis proposes: simplify a network’s
security risk level into a simple metric. Methods for this simplification of an entire
network’s security level are conducted on several characteristic networks. Identification
of computer network port vulnerabilities from NIST’s Network Vulnerability Database
(NVD) are conducted, and via utilization of NVD’s Common Vulnerability Scoring
System values, composite scores are created for each computer on the network, and then
collectively a composite score is computed for the entire network, which accurately
represents the health of the entire network. Special concerns about small numbers of
highly vulnerable computers or especially critical members of the network are
confronted.

viii

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Computer security becomes more important every day. With more and more
critical assets being digital information stored on computers, transmitted across networks
of computers, and available for access remotely, the number of ways that criminals can
steal, modify, or destroy data are ever increasing [1].With this rising concern and focus
on computer security, many administrators are looking to begin security auditing on their
networks, and to maintain a security policy that helps them protect their assets.
Identifying the condition of a network in order to remediate the security vulnerabilities it
has, is a major task.
How to be informational about the security level of a network without describing
the network in its entirety? Likewise, how can someone without extensive technical skill
understand the report, and thereby have an understanding of the network security? Is
there a way to simplify this security condition or report into an understandable form?
This is the problem propose to solve. By simplifying network security into a quantified,
simple value, effectively more information is gained from the reduction, in that the
information is usable more readily, easily comparable, and reachable by a wider
audience.

1.1 Motivation

Simplifying network security reports to a point where they reach a wider
audience, and are easier to understand will ultimately increase the security level in
computer networks. An increased understanding of the network security condition is
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necessary, in that currently network security reports are verbose and difficult to
understand. Security experts agree that long, complicated network security reports are
generally ignored by administration and clients, so reports must be concise and readable
by the target audience (not the security experts conducting the security reviews) [9].
Network security reports are not much use if there is no one capable of digesting them
and producing a response to the current security condition. Increasing computer security
rests on better informing those in a position to make a difference, and enhance security on
the system. Pursuant to this goal of making network security conditions on a computer
network understandable by a wider audience, and in order to make network security
quantifiable, thereby making the information applicable to more mathematical models,
this research proposes to quantify the network security condition in to a simple metric.
By simplifying this information into a usable state, the network security report will be
more understandable, in a standard form, and thereby utilizable by administration, or
network technicians, in order to remediate the problems on their network. More usable
information in the hands of network administrators will enable networks to be more
secure, in that a better understanding of the security “health” of the network will be
imparted, enabling action to be taken if needed.

1.2 Goals

This research aims to simplify computer network security reports into a single
scored metric, which gives a very accurate idea of just how secure a collection of
machines on a computer network are. This metric will reflect the entire network’s
security, as well as individual machines having an impact on the score. The score will
2

properly reflect the level of security on the sample characteristic networks that the
experiments will operate upon in this research. Generating a simple, quantified metric for
network security could also enable integration of this method into future quantitative
network security work.
This research’s approach is quantifying network security by first getting the
condition of the network, and then determining scores for its members, ultimately
generating a composite score for the entire network. Obtaining a network condition is
done by reading in a network condition, something similar to a network security scan,
and using this as a representation of the network. The network condition is then matched
against a list of known security vulnerabilities to scan for the signature of on the
network’s member machines. The presence of these vulnerabilities is determined by
matching the network condition to the vulnerability signatures in a well-known security
vulnerability database. A composite score for the entire network is then generated by first
scoring each machine on the network, and then combining the scores for all the machines
on the network into one composite score, via algorithms discussed later.

1.3 Overview

After the abstract, motivation, and goals of this research have been discussed in
chapter 1, the remainder of the thesis is laid out as follows:
Chapter 2 provides the background for computer security through an overview of
the common problems, the scale of risk by computer security vulnerabilities and solutions
to computer and network security.

Chapter 3 discusses the National Institute for

Standards and Technology’s National Vulnerability Database and its related components.
3

Discussion of its scoring system, CVSS, is also included. This database and the scoring
system are utilized within the thesis work to provide a foundation of nationally accredited
scores for network vulnerabilities, to which the thesis expands to the machine and then
network level in order to get composite scores at these respective levels.
The main work of the thesis, the research towards simplification via quantification
is presented in chapter 4. A few different approaches to the quantification of the network
security report are demonstrated and compared. Chapter 5 discusses the implementation
of the proposed algorithms and framework for quantifying the network. Chapter 6
explores the experimental paradigm to confirm the performance of the quantification
algorithms. Comparison of the scores from the proposed compositing methods will be
provided. Finally, chapter 7 discusses the efficacy of the proposed methods employed to
quantify the network and suggests future work which goes beyond this thesis.
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND

Computer security is concerned with the protection and assurance of digital
information. The protection of computers containing information via isolation from real
and potential threats, and the confirmation that the data is not compromised through
unknown threats is the goal. This security must be achieved while users and systems are
undisturbed and business continues as normal, though; a security system has failed if the
data to be protected is cut off from those whom it is intended for. The classic security
mantra of maintaining confidentiality, integrity, and availability (the CIA Triad as shown
in Figure 2.1 [36]) are what computer security marches on.

Figure 2.1: The CIA Triad

Confidentiality is maintaining the secrecy of data which must not be allowed to be
seen by all clients. Data which is secret or sensitive falls within this category. Nearly all
computer data falls under this scope when concerned with threats external to a computer
system, in that there are many ways to compromise a computer, with most concerned
5

with some information, which should be secret on a machine, such as passwords, system
configuration, or system status. Major concerns with confidentiality are obvious things
such as top secret documents, credit card information, and private records. Concerns over
confidentiality are so strong today that many physicians will not even adopt modern
digital medical records, due to concerns that the confidentiality of the data may be
compromised, since this is a situation where near-absolute confidentiality needs to be
assured [10]. Maintaining confidentiality is typically achieved via encryption of the data
to be protected, in order to prevent access to the data, even if the data storage is breached
by an attacker. Also, prevention of unauthorized access to computer systems is used in
order to secure the data, in order to keep it from being copied or viewed.
Integrity of data must be maintained, meaning the data must be kept in its original
form, unmodified, uncorrupted, and as stored. Data can not only be stolen, but it can be
modified as well, and left in place. A classic example of this is to modify computer
system passwords in order to create authorized access to systems by attackers, effectively
creating their own logins, and free-reign on the system, particularly if the account is in an
administrator role. Data stored on machines must also be protected from modification, to
guarantee when it is accessed after being stored, it is true to its original form, and so
malicious changes are not made to important information. Malicious code can also be
inserted into seemingly legitimate software, modifying the software, potentially changing
the functionality of the software, and perhaps disrupting the system and its data further.
Some code modifications such as this have been known to cause complete data loss on
systems through modification of operating systems [11]. Maintaining data integrity is
necessary in order to ensure the data is as intended, and not changed by malicious parties.
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Availability must be maintained in order to keep the data which is protected by
security, available to those whom are authorized to view or change the data. Security has
failed if everyone is kept out, including those who should pass security. Striking the
balance between securing the network too tightly, and thereby preventing legitimate
access, and securing the network too lightly, and thereby allowing too great a chance of
malicious access, is a difficult task. This balance is a major concern with computer
security, particularly when concerned with security which operates on a continuum of
security, such as computer firewall configuration, or network filter administration. Data
becoming unavailable due to over-zealous security procedures is one of the most
common failures of computer security today, particularly from client and users’
viewpoint [12]. Even if a computer system is never compromised in any way, clients are
likely to have encountered cases where legitimate requests on their part for information
were impeded or prevented due to such overbearing security procedures. The balance
between data available to everyone and data available to no one is a continuum on which
computer security administrators and experts must balance very carefully.
Network security is a growing concern with economies and global assets moving
online, and becoming increasingly data-centric. In 2001, US-CERT (United States
Computer Emergency Readiness Team) recognized 52,000 online computer security
attacks; this increase in attacks was a 150% growth over the previous year [1]. Moving
data online allows greater freedom of information, inherently increasing the ease of
access to the information. These are desirable in general, but with intended access, there
are created unintended avenues of access which allow those whom are not allowed to
read/modify/delete the information to do just that. Preventing the unlawful and
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unintended viewing, recording, modification, or even removal of data is of paramount
importance, particularly when these assets are becoming increasingly the backbone of
global economies, and military assets.
The cost of security breaches is truly great, with the cost of identity theft from
data intrusions being in the billions in 2003 according to the Federal Trade Commission
[3]. In order to protect these increasingly exposed assets, administrators must work to
remove avenues of unlawful access to this data, in order to preserve its content.
Discovering these methods of accessing the data unlawfully can be hard to detect, and are
often built into the very systems that they use, albeit mostly on accident. Something so
minor as some computer software which was not written as securely as it should have
been can be the culprit for exposing data. Alternatively, misconfigured computers or
network hardware can be the issue. These machines can have network access ports which
allow malicious code, or intruders to infiltrate and access the machine in question,
remotely. Data is then compromised through a variety of means.
The security of computer systems is increasingly important, as data becomes more
important in the global economy, and as more data is made available. The availability of
the data very often correlates directly with the level of vulnerability the data is subjected
to. Once data is out and available, keeping it in the hands of only those that are supposed
to have it is a great challenge.

2.1 Computer Security

Computer security starts with understanding the types of vulnerabilities
computers are subjected to. Computer security, for personal computers, is concerned
8

more often than not with eliminating methods of exterior access to your machine by other
computers which intend to access your machine. Things such as open communication
ports, misconfigured security measures from the machine’s operating system, or even
improperly secured sharing settings, can leave a computer wide open to attackers to get
data or otherwise compromise your machine. Many factors play together to make a
machine vulnerable to attackers, but with proper maintenance and vulnerability countermeasure, most security flaws can be counteracted, and sealed up to prevent any
exploitation by attackers.
Securing a personal computer by keeping software updated with the latest version
is one way to protect machines. Software vulnerabilities are constantly being discovered
by security firms and software companies, which then enable the companies that produce
the software to fix the problem. Fixing the problem removes the vulnerability, effectively
eliminating the possibility of exploiting the computer via that avenue. Once the problem
is fixed, a new patch or version of the software is created, which allows users to update
the software on their computers, sealing this vulnerability. Without the patches, machines
are left vulnerable to security vulnerabilities, waiting to be exploited. Also, with software
constantly being updated with new functionality and features, the number of software
vulnerabilities each machine possesses increases. A quantitative study of computer
software security vulnerabilities shows that as operating systems and other software
becomes more complex, the number of vulnerabilities will increase at a predictable rate
[8]. With a significant rate of vulnerabilities being created all the time, continual patching
of these vulnerabilities is necessary to close them off. The longer these vulnerabilities are
left open, of course the greater chance of any individual machine being exploited via
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these vulnerabilities. Additionally, as new vulnerabilities are discovered, they become
more and more commonplace as tools of the trade for criminal agents to exploit one’s
computers. Very common, powerful vulnerabilities which have been known for years can
still be a threat, if one does not update their software after they install it. For example, a
20-year old vulnerability known colloquially as the “ping of death,” was a Microsoft
Windows vulnerability which allowed attackers to cause a buffer overflow, allowing the
attacker to crash or gain access to the machine, depending on the content of the ping used
in the attack. This was also exploited by some websites, which contained code which
would automatically execute a ping of death attack on clients connecting to the site,
which allowed websites to take control of personal computer machines very easily
through gaining remote access to the machine, and saving the credentials for attackers
who maintained the web server [4]. The vulnerability still affects all modern operating
systems without applying the fix for it, and has affected them for years.
Personal computer software firewalls can protect vulnerable computers as well.
This type of firewall differs from a network firewall device, in that it is a software
firewall running on the machine itself, rather than filtering network traffic in-line. A
firewall can be a dedicated network device, or a machine on the network, filtering traffic,
or even just a piece of software on the individual machine, running in the background to
protect it. A firewall is an application which scans incoming network traffic, and does not
allow some of the traffic to pass. This in effect serves as a “fire wall” which keeps known
bad traffic out, and allows only traffic which passes inspection by the firewall to pass.
Firewalls help to stop exploitation of machines on the network, or on the machine
running a software firewall, even before they begin. For example, the famous Slammer
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worm which is commonly regarded as the fastest spreading computer worm, could
exploit a machine with just one packet sent to UDP port 1434, exploiting SQL Server’s
security vulnerability. Blocking traffic from all but trusted hosts that need to access
SQL’s management functions was critical in preventing any further spread of the worm
[7]. A common application of a firewall would be blocking traffic on a particular
computer network port. Traffic to a port which is known to be exploited commonly, can
be blocked entirely from entering the network, effectively eliminating the security
vulnerability as an access avenue. Firewalls on personal machines can also be fine-tuned
to the user’s needs. Not only can the network be filtered from the outside networks
attempting to access it, but also the user can filter even the traffic which comes through to
the user’sown specifications. Each port can be blocked in turn on your machine only,
blocking traffic through a port entirely, or just for a specific application, etc., allowing
your personal computer to be protected from internal network threats. An example for
firewall is shown in Figure 2.2 [35].
Figure 2.2: Firewall Example
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2.2 Network Security

Securing a computer network is somewhat similar to securing a personal
computer, in that the desire is to eliminate access by unauthorized or otherwise
undesirable agents. Access to a network is a two-part endeavor between two machines. A
communication session typically is established between the two machines, which enable
them to communicate, exchanging messages over some communication medium.
Communication over most networks functions this way, and due to this, a major concern
is removing the possibility of undesired communication channels being established
between machines on the network, or accessing a machine on a network from the
outside.
Preventing these communications from occurring is the grand challenge for
enforcing network security. Besides security on personal computers and other machines
on the network, network administrators must attempt to stop content before it reaches
clients on the network. The idea of many network security measure or technique is that
network security is the first line of defense, eliminating as many threats as possible
before communications reach clients’ machines, which are effectively the last line of
defense against malicious agents communicating across the network.
One effective method of increasing the security in a network is to not allow
malicious communication into the network at all, effectively stopping it at the “front
door” of a network. Via network hardware which is in-line between the network being
secured, and the wider network outside, such as the Internet, security can be enhanced.
Network security devices, including network filters, spam boxes, firewalls, etc., are all
intended to filter out content entering the network, which is not allowed based on the
12

security policy of the network. Security administrators and network administrators can
configure these devices to block traffic selectively based on a set of rules which detail the
“fingerprint” of the malicious or suspicious content as it attempts to be relayed into the
network. These rules are based on such things as the content of the data, format, whether
it’s encrypted or not, the communication port used, transmission protocol, point of origin,
point of destination, etc. These rules, which are complicated to create, and can be difficult
to “fine-tune” to being just-right, are the basis for the performance of most network
security hardware.
The rules on these machines must be tuned to a level which is “just right.” This
means that the rule prevents malicious activity on the network by blocking malicious
traffic trying to enter the network, but also the rules must not prevent legitimate traffic
from entering the network. If this occurs, the security appliances are preventing proper
utilization of the network, which is undesirable, to say the least. Intuitively, a network
perfectly secured from the outside world would be one in which no traffic is allowed in.
This type of network would not have any malicious traffic incoming from the outside, but
obviously it has issues. A network must allow traffic, or else it is useless, and one might
as well just unplug from the wider networks. On the other hand, a perfectly usable
network would be one in which no traffic is prevented from entering the network. This
allows the users the best freedom, since all traffic is allowed, and thereby no legitimate
traffic is prevented from arriving at its destination. This type of network is a user’s utopia
in concept, particularly if they are accustomed to strict network security rules, but as with
the other paradigm, the security administrator’s utopia, this paradigm does not work in
practice, since the entire network is exposed to all forms of attacks. Striking the balance
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between these worlds is the challenge. Quantitative analysis of firewall configurations
has found that as the complexity and quantity of the rules increase, the number of
configuration errors there are, so getting them right, but not too complex is difficult [6].
Ensuring access to the network, while preventing malicious access is a fine balance, and a
challenge which occupies network administrators.

2.3 Impact of Security

Computer security is increasingly important with the move towards digital assets.
As more and more companies are valued based on information they possess in digital
form, or provision of digital services, the pressure to maintain security on these digital
assets has increased. A security breach allowing access to digital information which is of
a critical nature at a digital company can cost the company large amounts of money in
lost market edge. Additionally, markets are very sensitive to security breaches more and
more, as they receive widespread news coverage anymore. Even if a breach is found to
have not revealed large amounts of information critical to the company, the damage may
have already been done, in the form of market or trader panic, dropping the share price of
publicly traded companies’ stocks [2].
Besides the damage done from revealing confidential information which might be
of strategic or intellectual value to the companies in question, many companies must
protect their customers’ information as well. With the surge in online sales, with large
online dealers dealing in huge numbers of customers, customers’ personal information,
and even financial information is at risk if the company is exploited. Personal information
such as names, addresses, other demographical information, social security numbers, can
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be stolen, leading to the information being used to impersonate the person in financial
transactions, leading to ruined credit, fraudulent purchases, etc., all based on the identity
profiles which were stolen from a company which did not properly protect their
customers’ data.
For example, Sony Computer Entertainment, maker of the popular computer
gaming console series, the PlayStation, had their online gaming and entertainment service
hacked in 2011. The attackers had access to, and presumably saved, 77 million users’
credit card data, used to subscribe to the service, or buy things through it. Despite Sony’s
claim that the data was encrypted on their servers, and protected, it was stored unencrypted, and easily accessible through some of the system’s vulnerabilities. The result
was that the popular console’s online service was offline for weeks, and much confidence
was lost in Sony’s console and their security when handling customers’ sensitive data.
Sony stated that the cost of the intrusion was approximately $171M [5].
Stolen information is one large source of damage to businesses and organizations
with networked data servers, but also one must be concerned with interruption of service.
For retailers, especially those online, the more hours which your storefront is open the
more sales you receive. Keeping online businesses accessible at all hours, on all days, all
year long is of critical importance. Even a few minutes of downtime can cost large
amounts of money from lost sales, not only from direct missed sales when customers try
to access your site, and it is down, but also through second-hand missed sales from
customers’ who lose confidence in your storefront since it has been “brought down” by
attackers in the past. Keeping outside attackers from clogging your web servers with
illegitimate communications requests, false users, or even clogging the network which
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feeds into your personal network, is of paramount importance. Being able to recognize
the difference between a high traffic load and an attack is also an important skill for
administrators, in that the behavior can often be very similar.
Overall, security administrators must be able to keep confidential information
secret, and out of attackers’ hands. Damage can not only be dealt to companies from lost
technical or secret planning information, but also through loss of confidence, uncertainty
about what information was lost, or even loss or revealing of customers’ information to
attackers whom will very possibly use the information in identity theft style crimes. The
continued protection of this confidential information, while keeping it available to those
who need to access it across the network, is of utmost importance for network and
security administrators.

2.4 Security Auditing Software

Tools for scanning computers and computer networks for security risks exist
fairly commonly today. Many network administrators, and especially computer security
experts, must be able to get an idea of the condition of the network in order to remedy
problems. Network scanning tools can provide detailed reports of the network conditions,
vulnerabilities present, and sometimes what needs to be done for vulnerabilities based on
certain databases which store the vulnerabilities and solutions. These reports list the
vulnerabilities which appear, and which host they appear on. The tools described below
are some of the most popular tools currently developed, and represent a cross-section of
the vulnerability scanning software field.
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2.4.1 Metasploit

Metasploit is an open-source security vulnerability scanner. Metasploit is the most
popular scanning tool according to a recent SecTools survey [18]. Metasploit is designed
to enhance network security penetration testing audits. Metasploit was developed to
produce an open-source tool for determining network security condition via vulnerability
detection and analysis. Metasploit maintains its own database of vulnerabilities detected
and exploited successfully. Metasploit is also popular due to it being a widelyencompassing project, including a vulnerability scanner, and its sub-project, the
Metasploit Framework, which is a popular framework for discovering new exploits,
writing the code to exploit them, and then deploying the exploit. Newly discovered
exploits are usually added to the Metasploit database, enhancing the utility of the
database, since so many current professionals contribute to the database, and keep it up to
date with the latest exploits being developed [17].
Metasploit detects vulnerabilities through simple signature matching of
vulnerabilities to port scan results. Scanning results turns out ports which are vulnerable,
and through the matching of these to the vulnerability list, signatures can be matched, and
the vulnerability can be detected. Once vulnerabilities are detected, the resulting report
details which vulnerabilities are present, in a large listing. The resulting scan can then be
used to determine which machines to test with the exploiting framework, to see whether
the vulnerability has been patched, even though the communication avenue is still open
[19]. The resulting report delineates based upon host, and also contains detailed
information about the host. Each host’s vulnerabilities are listed, with information about
the specific identification of the vulnerability and when it was detected also listed [20].
17

2.4.2 Nessus

Nessus is a proprietary scanner, developed by Tenable Network Security, and is a
cross-platform signature-based scanner utilizing plugins as the basis for determining
which vulnerabilities are present [13]. Nessus was originally an open-source project,
which has now become monetized and enterprise-level software in many respects. The
classic Nessus 2 engine and its predecessors are open-source via an open-source license
allowing reproduction but not sale. The release was forked with the creation of Nessus 3,
whereupon all new content will be sold, and is privately licensed, though plugin updates
for Nessus 2 are still being released, allowing it to still be up to date in terms of which
vulnerabilities are known, albeit the older Nessus 2 engine [14].
Nessus scans the network first via a port-scan tool, designed to pick up which
ports are open for communication to the device. Nessus has four different scanners
available, and though some configuration, can alternatively use other existing scanners
that are available on the internet [15] [16]. Nessus then utilizes exploits to attempt to
exploit the vulnerabilities detected, in order to determine if the device really is vulnerable
to the vulnerability. Nessus uses its proprietary NASL (Nessus Attack Script Language)
to run these vulnerability checks. The definition of what attacks can be attempted, and
what vulnerabilities are known, are updated on a weekly basis through what are known as
“plugins.” Once a scan is run, and vulnerabilities are detected, it provides a large report
of what was detected in a choice of a number of formats including plain text, XML,
HTML, and more. The vulnerabilities are listed which were detected, and can then be
searched or filtered in order to determine the network condition more finely.
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2.4.3 Nmap

Nmap is a security scanner which attempts to map out a network and discover the
clients and applications running on the network, in order to understand the network’s
condition. In addition to this scanning, Nmap can do port scanning on clients, enabling a
security analysis of the clients much like other scanners. Nmap can determine details
about the hosts such as type of device, and presence of firewalls. Many other security
tools use Nmap as their base in order to get the network condition [21]. Nmap is open
source and cross-platform as well, enabling easy expansion and adaption of the tool to fit
the needs of the user.
Nmap also has adaptive scanning, enabling what many tools do not; Nmap can
scan a network much more successfully than other tools through careful scanning. Nmap
has the ability to scan with attention paid to network latency, congestion, and even the
target being resistant to the scans, in order to get a better scan on the network’s condition
[23]. This scanning also enables Nmap to not be detected and stopped by other network
security automated devices, which enhances Nmap’s effectiveness as compared to other
simple scanning tools [22]. Nmap utilizes vulnerability databases as other tools do in
order to match the open ports detected with known vulnerabilities, and stands out as the
most directly useful network scanner for many projects. Nmap serves as the basis for
many more complicated tools, in that its simple nature, and the structure of its
implementation allows easy integration.
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2.4.4 Audit Software Issues

All the audit software programs that have been described have common goals,
and common issues, relating to the goals of this thesis’s research. The reports generated
are more complex and detailed than can be easily understood in many cases, since the
volume of data created is very large. Filtering or otherwise data mining the report is
required in order to understand just what is going on in the network. Additionally, just the
reports are given, which does not necessarily give a score for how severe the issues are
on the system(s) in question. The goals of this thesis are to confront this issue, and
produce a score which simplifies these reports, providing a uniquely simple network
health metric.
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CHAPTER 3: NIST’S COMPUTER SECURITY ASSETS

With the ever increasing demand for computer data security, and the rising risk to
national assets associated with national data of critical importance being more at risk, the
United States Government funded initiatives to create a national security asset (as shown
in Figure 3.1 [38] ) capable of increasing the security on computer networks [24]. This
security asset is concerned with increasing the level of security on government machines,
overall hardening government computers and their integral data from outside attackers.
Common security issues are catalogued, evaluated, and solutions generated for resolving
the vulnerability and returning the machine to a more secure state. A strong degree of
certification and professionalism in the identification and verification of the
vulnerabilities and fixes within these databases was of paramount importance, in order to
guarantee the usefulness of the database. By scanning a network, matching the network
condition to the database and identifying network security issues this way, the research in
this thesis intends to rate a computer network’s security health via nationally accredited
security metrics.
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Figure 3.1: NIST Security Assets

3.1 Common Vulnerabilities and Exploits – CVE

The Common Vulnerabilities and Exploits Database (CVE) is a concerted effort
on the part of the MITRE Corporation, a non-profit organization managing national
defense and research facilities, foundations, and projects [26]. CVE works to combine
publicly known common vulnerabilities into one database, uniting the many
commercially maintained, and publically contributed security vulnerability databases
[25]. This central database allows each of the vulnerabilities to have one unique
identifier, a CVE id, such as “CVE-2001-1723.” The use of unique identifiers reduces the
complexity of the international security threat identification effort, in that there are fewer
duplicate vulnerabilities circulating, enabling a cleaner, simpler network report to be
generated. CVE serves as more of a dictionary of vulnerabilities than a database, with
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each of the vulnerabilities listed and defined, but not explained to any great detail, nor
solutions suggested, as in more advanced databases. CVE is a great and unique tool for
centralizing vulnerability identification, and serves as a common-language for different
security data sources and organizations.

3.2 Common Vulnerability Scoring System - CVSS

The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is an open framework for
providing a repeatable quantitative score for computer security vulnerabilities. The
degree to which a security risk is presented based upon how severe the security
vulnerability is, is reflected in the CVSS score [27]. Each of the vulnerabilities can be
given a CVSS score through a review process in order to evaluate it by security
professionals, and the vulnerability’s exploitations that have occurred in the past. In order
to compare how severe each type of security vulnerability is to each other, we must
evaluate them using a quantitative evaluation of them, such as CVSS provides. CVSS is
unique as a scoring system, in terms of how reputable it is, and how wide-reaching its
implementation has been, across many NIST supported security vulnerability assets.
CVSS utilizes a multi-faceted approach to scoring vulnerabilities. The final CVSS
score is in fact a combination of the exploitability metrics and the impact metrics. The
combination of these subscores yields the CVSS base score, which is utilized widely, and
is independent of the situation, organization, network, and other variables in which the
vulnerability may be present. The exploitability metrics are concerned with how the
attacker will be able to access the machine with the vulnerability and how to exploit it.
The complexity of the attack, the level of access needed to invoke the attack, and how
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deep in the network the system exists (how deep the attacker would have to delve from
the network’s entry point to exploit it), are all concerns. The impact metric is concerned
with the CIA of the system. Is the vulnerability going to affect the confidentiality,
integrity, or availability of the data, or a composite of this? In order to include
considerations about the specific situation where the vulnerability has manifest itself,
CVSS allows use of the environmental and temporal sub scores, which increases the
accuracy of the score, provided the network situation is properly known, in order to
provide this information. The environmental subscore considers how much of an impact
this vulnerability would have upon the organization, and how many systems on the
network are vulnerable on the network. Additionally, modifications to the impact subscore are used, considering how much confidentiality, integrity, and accessibility is a
concern. The temporal sub-score enables inclusion of situational data about the
vulnerability in the wild per-se. Information about how long the vulnerability has been
available openly (like released on the internet, and well known, for example), the types of
fixes available to resolve the issue, and the level of validation that has been done to make
sure the vulnerability exists, and is exploitable. Inclusion of this extra information makes
the scores customized to your network, and they no longer apply to the worlds’ situation
any longer. Only the base-score is network and situational independent, allowing a wider
level of utilization [27].
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3.3 National Vulnerability Database – NVD
The National Vulnerability Database (NVD) is one of NIST’s important security
assets for determining the severity of computer security risks. NVD is the sum of many
other security databases, and utilizes the CVSS scoring system, allowing the fullest
utilization of available public computer security risk analysis, and quantification methods
via CVSS scores [28]. NVD is also linked with CVE, enabling comparison and expansion
of NVD with CVE entries. Expanding CVE entries to include references for where the
vulnerability was found, how it might be fixed, and much more, is the role NVD plays on
expanding security databases, rather than just being a superset of other databases and
dictionaries. NVD is also part of NIST’s Information Security Automation Program
(ISAP), which is a move towards enabling computer controlled security appliances and
software to increase computer security through automatic resolution of existing and
newly discovered vulnerabilities [29]. The CVSS scores from NVD, and identified
vulnerability signatures in NVD entries allows for this automated approach. NVD is used
as the primary resource for finding vulnerabilities and determining their comparative
severity and impact. Using NVD’s information about the vulnerabilities, vulnerability
signatures can be derived, enabling matching of network conditions to the extracted
signatures, then matching to CVE IDs, and getting the CVSS base score from the NVD
entries, scores can be acquired for each of the vulnerabilities which has been identified
from the matching process. NVD provides a reputable, widely used, constantly updated,
and openly available resource for basing this research upon.
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3.4 NIST Security Asset Conclusions
While NIST’s security assets that have been described are useful to many
researchers, they are more of a foundation to further research than a security appliance in
their own. The databases and dictionaries enable security professionals and developers of
security tools to consolidate the many different definitions of vulnerabilities, and get an
idea of how severe given vulnerabilities are, but that is as far as these resources takes
you. Many security appliances, like those mentioned in sections 2.4.1-3 go so far as to tie
discovered vulnerabilities to their CVE entry numbers or pull the vulnerability
information from NVD, but they do not attempt to profile the entire network situation as
a single security environment. These tools profile each of the vulnerabilities separately,
providing information relevant to the vulnerability, the threats present that may exploit it,
and its status as exploitable, but provide no groundwork for profiling the entire network.
The other security auditing tools we have looked at may list the severity of each of the
vulnerabilities, but this research expands upon this by compositing multiple
vulnerabilities’ scores into a machine’s total score, and further along as an entire
network’s complete score. Compositing these scores into combined scores builds upon
NIST’s security foundation that they have laid with these tools, and expands the
functionality of these resources though providing another application for them,
considering the entire machine, or the entire network, providing a larger security
condition.
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CHAPTER 4: QUANTIFYING NETWORK SECURITY

The new work of this thesis is concerned with defining the security “health” of a
network, and generating a new metric for creating a composite, quantitative score which
represents the health of a computer network’s security. The new system implemented in
this thesis will provide a double value between 0 and 10 inclusive, in order to keep in line
with NIST’s CVSS scoring system, to reflect the level of security or insecurity of a given
network. A network of computers will be scanned with a port-scanning tool such as
Nmap, determining which ports are open on machines in the network. Based upon the
ports open, and matching to the NVD entries’ information about what situation describes
a given single vulnerability, the certain security vulnerabilities which exist in a network
can be determined. The security vulnerabilities detected are security exploits that may
occur is a malicious agent exploits the vulnerability, meaning that the situation could be
ripe for them to exploit the given machine, based on the condition detected on the
network. Taking the list of vulnerabilities that the machines have, scores are retrieved
from their respective NVD entries, and the scores are used as the basis for quantifying the
network. The scores for each of the vulnerabilities are combined into a score for the given
computer, and then the scores for all the computers are in turn combined into a single
score for the entire network. This compositing is studied as the primary focus of the
thesis, in that combining a network security report into a single quantified value, whilst
still maintaining an accurate reflection of the network’s security situation is challenging.
Three methods for this composition are proposed, demonstrated and compared, with the
latter of the three being the result of experimentation and optimization of the compositing
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technique. The resulting score will be from 0-10 inclusive, in-line with CVSS scores,
with the most vulnerable networks (the least healthy) holding a score of 10, and the most
secure networks (the most healthy), with a score of 0 to 3.9 being high health, 4.0-6.9
being medium health, and 7.0-10.0 being low health.

4.1 Approach

The approach for this thesis work is to find a way to simplify network security
reports to a point where they are more accessible, and more easily digestible by more
users. The complexity and length of the current reports is too long to make them directly
useful. It makes filtering, data mining, or some other method for extracting information
from the reports necessary in order to utilize them effectively. The reasoning behind this
is that if the data remains hidden, or is not understandable by those in a position to do
something about increasing security, the data may well never exist. Increasing the
viability of the data has the effect of increasing security in this situation, since the hidden
data becomes available. Gathering a network situation via network scans, then working
the data via this thesis’s method garners a simpler representation of the network situation,
enabling quicker, easier, and wider understanding of the network situation. A typical
network vulnerability architecture is shown in Figure 4.1[37].
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Figure 4.1: Network Vulnerability Architecture

The thesis works as follows: first a network situation exists. This situation can be
understood as a typical TCP switched network of many user machines connected to
switches which are connected together behind some form of router which joins this local
network to the wider network outside, usually the Internet. Typically a scan of security by
a security administrator will be concerned with their internal network, the network behind
this router. Utilizing a tool like Nmap, the research can scan the network to pick up which
ports are open to communication on the machines within the network. Once the ports are
detected, we know which communication ports may be used to exploit the machines on
the network. In order to know just how the machines might be compromised, we consult
with NVD in order to pull out known port vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities which are
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identified as being port vulnerabilities are retrieved from NVD, and matched against the
open ports on the machines within the target network. If a match is found, this means that
the computer with the match may be exploitable via this vulnerability. The vulnerability
is logged, and the rest of the network is checked over for vulnerabilities as well, until all
possible matches are exhausted. Once the matches are found, the CVSS scores for each of
the vulnerabilities are found, and are used in combining the scores into a composite score.

4.2 Compositing Methods

In order to simplify the scores obtained from NVD for the vulnerabilities which
the system has detected on the network machines, the scores must be combined in some
way to get a final value. A method has been devised to get the composite score for all the
vulnerabilities on each machine, which works as follows:

Equation 1: Vulnerability Compositing Method
( )
( )⁄

( )

(
(

)

)
(

(

∏ ( )
))

(1)

The method for combining the vulnerabilities into one score for the machine is
found by first taking each of the vulnerabilities in turn, and getting their CVSS base
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scores. The CVSS scores range from [0, 10] with the higher the worse security, we get
this via the V(v) function. Next, the security function (S(v)) is applied to the score,
rendering a score which is [0, 1], with the higher the better security. This number is
utilized through generating the product of all these security scores from all the
vulnerabilities, generating one composite number from [0,1], with the higher the better.
This score is then converted back with the health function (H(v)) generating the final
machine score, which matches the CVSS scoring method of [0-10] with 10 being least
secure.
For compositing the machine scores into a final score for the entire network,
many methods were tested, in order to get some comparative values, and determine the
best way to composite these scores without losing information about the network security
condition. The more accurate the final score is, the better, so having a final score that
reflects very accurately the security situation in the network is the primary goal. To this
end, the best of these compositing methods were experimented with, and provide some
perspective on the efficacy of the last solution described, which appears to be the most
accurate.

4.2.1 Linear Compositing

Linear compositing of the scores is the most straight forward approach, so this
was tried first to get a baseline for the research. Obtaining the scores from NVD for each
of the vulnerabilities, the scores were combined, giving a composite score for the entire
network after each machine was composited via the vulnerability composting method
from Equation 1. The compositing method for the linear compositing method is to take
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the sum of the client scores in the network we generated before, and divide by the
number of clients, giving the mathematical mean. This straight forward approach treats
all computers equally. The compositing is computed as follows: for clients C from
{

} we have:

Equation 2: Linear Compositing Method
( )
(

(

)
(

)

∑
)

(2)

Issues with this approach are as follows. Firstly, the approach is perhaps too equal
with its treatment of the clients. With many clients of the same composite scores, the
network may get a score close to that of all the vulnerabilities. For example, if the
machine had ten or more vulnerabilities which were all 2.5, the final score for the
network would be 2.5. This does not truthfully reflect the security level on the network,
in that the network, which has a large numberof vulnerable machines, is really more
vulnerable than 2.5 , in that there are more ways to exploit the network than were the
network to have just a single vulnerable client with a CVSS score of 2.5. This bit of
information is lost when this linear compositing is done on these situations. Additionally,
this same problem can perhaps hide severe issues. Were a network to have a number of
weakly vulnerable clients, and a single critically severe security risk client, the severely
vulnerable client may be obscured somewhat in the final score, since the score will be
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driven down from the level of the one vulnerability.With a network that contains a client
score of 8.5 and other clients with lower scores, the net score will be less than 8.5
because the average will be brought down by the lower scores.The resulting score from
the method can end up lower if a network has many low risk vulnerabilities than if a
network does not, since the high score will not be reduced. This can cause issues with the
accuracy of the score in situations where the numbers of vulnerable machines are not
roughly equal. In light of these issues, linear compositing is not the best method to get an
accurate picture of the network security condition.

4.2.2 Weighted Non-Role Based Compositing

The weighted non-role based compositing method is the second method which is
proposed and tested. This method is similar to the vulnerability compositing method
utilized on each machine. This method confronts the problem of less important
vulnerabilities of lesser scoring severity than the more severe scores causing the score to
be drawn down. This scoring method allows each machine to add the collective scoring,
without reduction based on a score being lower. This method allows for the severity of
the security vulnerability level on the network to increase as the quantity of the
vulnerabilities in relation to the size of the network to increase. The product of the client
scores is generated, resulting in a more accurate image of what the network situation is.
The composite is generated as follows:
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Equation 3: Weighted Non-Role Based Compositing Method
( )
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This method addresses the issues encountered with the linear compositing method
by taking into account the quantity the vulnerable clients on the network. This is
confronted in the last compositing method. This method does take into account that more
important vulnerabilities affect the composite score more, which is an important
improvement over the linear compositing method, in that the scores are not reduced too
much by less severely vulnerable clients. A score generated by this method represents
the network situation more accurately, but it can be tweaked in order to generate even
better results, which is what the final method, the role-based method demonstrates.

4.2.3 Weighted Role-Based Compositing Method

The weighted role-based combination is conducted via giving the members of the
network different weightings based on how critical they are on the network. For example,
if a machine has the access rights to the other machines on the network, or serve some
sort of administrative role which allows the machine to have special privileges over the
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other machines, the machine will be given a higher weighting than other, less critical
machines. This increased weight of the score on this machine allows the machine to be
given a greater impact on the total score for the machine and the network at each level of
the compositing process. The score can be adapted based on how critical the machine is,
and allows for greater control of the network setup information. With this additional
information about which machines are critical in the network, the situation is more
accurately represented than when this information is absent. This weighting is a means to
enhance the level of information in the network situation. This compositing is conducted
as follows:

Equation 4: Weighted Role-Based Compositing Method
( )
P(c)

Importance Rating for Client (Exponent for Client’s Score)
( )⁄

( )
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)
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(

(
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))
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This compositing is similar to the weighted non-role based compositing method,
save for the exponent applied to the client score. This exponent effectively increases the
influence that the particular client with a higher importance score (higher exponent) has
on the network’s score overall. More important clients on the network will have a higher
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weight, as appropriate to the importance of the client, with scores from 1-5 being the
tested paradigm. Ultra critical members are assigned an importance exponent of at most
5, with this being an extreme case, where even moderate vulnerabilities on this client may
have extreme effects on the final score. Most clients in typical networks are assigned the
standard importance of 1, which does not affect their score contribution. This weighting
can be fine-tuned by administrators in order to get a better feel for the network situation,
and can be updated to increase the accuracy of the network quantification. This method
provides the best results in the experimental results shown in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 5: SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS

Within this section of the thesis, discussion of how the algorithms and framework
for quantifying the network were implemented will be provided. General approaches for
the problems encountered, as well as specifics about the implementation details will be
discussed, though code will not. Please refer to the code listings for code-level
implementation details. The system was implemented in JAVA, utilizing JDK 1.7, and
only Sun JAVA native libraries (no extraneous expansion libraries).

5.1 Framework Overview

The framework for the implementation of the algorithms is as follows: Several
classes were developed to represent the network situation and to quantify the network’s
security situation. The problems of creating this system were overcome in several steps,
with each being integrated into a central framework. The framework is a collection of
classes which compartmentalize the functionality of the algorithm and enable the code to
be very modular. The collection of classes is called together through static method calls
to enable the full functionality for testing. Integration with NVD and the quantification
algorithms themselves are called together through the framework of classes.

5.2 Inputs and Format

The input for the quantification is in several pieces. The first piece is a file which
lists all the NVD database shards which are to be used by the system to find port
vulnerabilities to detect. This file is a simple one entry per line text file which is picked
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up by the NVD Parser class, which extracts data though data mining techniques from
these large NVD files. NVD makes the entries for NVD available through a set of large
XML files, with their own special tag set, with one file being released each year, and a
running-total file of the new vulnerabilities for the partial calendar year in progress (the
modified entry in the set). The NVD shards can be downloaded directly from their
website [30]. The entries, within their XML tags, allow easy extraction through data
mining techniques. Each of these NVD shards is also to be made available to the software
on the local machine.
The next input for the system is the network scan. The scan, such as Nmap
generates, must be included in the system’s format for the system to process. The scan
itself contains the information about the network condition, as scanned by the network
port scanner. The open communication ports on the client machines on the network are
listed, as well as identified by the IP address of the client. The system also supports
weighted combinations, so the respective importance factor of the clients in the network
are also part of the input file, and can be edited to increase the accuracy of the report, if
necessary. This scan is formatted in such a way that the software understands the entries.
Scans from various software platforms for network scanning can be adapted to the
required format through adaption classes in the platform, and more adaptors can be
written to expand the tool’s functionality.
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5.3 Processing Inputs

Processing of the input files conducted as described here. The processing of the
NVD source files, which are in XML format is done by first optimizing the file for our
mining. Initially the files are formatted without whitespace, and have many tags to
separate the sections. In order to easy data mining, the tags brackets (“<” and “>”) are
removed and replaced with spaces, effectively space-delimiting the file for mining. The
now space-delimited file is then mined for each entry, and each entry is identified
whether it is port vulnerability or not. The vulnerabilities which are not are discarded,
whilst the ones which are port vulnerabilities, are stored in the output file, which
ultimately is the input for the NVD Matching class. The entries are mined through
detection of the start tag for each entry. Each entry has a CVE identifier number, which is
stored to uniquely identify each of the vulnerabilities in the database, and also is marked
with a unique tag in the file. The combination is detected, and the ID is stored. Next the
CVSS base score is extracted through detection of the CVSS scoring section, and
extraction via regular formatting of the entry. The score is stored for later use in scoring
the machines and networks based on these CVSS scores. The description of the
vulnerability is extracted, and mined itself, with the section being found via its summary
tag. The section is mined for mentions of specific ports being used in the vulnerability, in
that NVD lists port vulnerabilities with their exploited ports in their summary
descriptions. If a port is found in this section, the entry is kept, and is deemed port
vulnerability, and stored in the output file. After all of the entries are processed, the input
processing is finished for the NVD source files. The NVD source is currently just over
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48000 CVE entries [31], and is processed in a few minutes on an average performance,
modern consumer laptop.

5.4 Matching to NVD Entries

Determining which vulnerabilities are present on the network is done by matching
up the condition of the machines on the network to the NVD entries describing the
conditions required for a vulnerability to be present. As described in section 5.1.2, the
system compares each machine’s condition to each vulnerability in the NVD entries used
in this thesis, in order to determine which vulnerabilities are present.. The entries in this
subset database have a number of communication ports associated with them, which must
be open on the target machines in order to exploit the vulnerability on the machine. The
system takes the network situation input file, which lists clients on the network via the
unique identifier of their IP address, and the open ports on their machines, and matches
these open ports to the ports required for the vulnerability to perhaps be present on the
target machine. The ports which must be open for the vulnerability to be exploited are
called the “vulnerability signature.” We search for a match between the signatures of
each of the vulnerabilities on each machine in the network in turn, discovering which are
present on the network. Once the vulnerabilities are detected, each client object in the
system has a collection of unique vulnerabilities present on that machine, which in turn
contains information about which CVE entry is detected, the CVSS base score for this
vulnerability, and ancillary information such as the NVD description for the
vulnerability. With this information discovered through this process of signature
matching, the system is ready to score the machines and collective network.
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5.5 Compositing and Scores Generation

Compositing of the CVSS scores for each of the vulnerabilities is conducted in
several different ways in order to research the efficacy of different approaches, and
ultimately was done to create the final role-based compositing method. Compositing via
linear composition, weighted combination and the role-based compositing method were
all implemented in order to develop an effective scoring quantification on a variety of
systems in the experimental data later in this thesis. The details for the compositing
methods are discussed below.
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CHAPTER 6: EXPERIMENTAL PARADIGM

The experimental paradigm explored in this thesis is that of confirming the
performance of the quantification algorithms via matching the scores to known
vulnerable and so-called “patched” systems. In certain well-documented situations,
vulnerabilities have been studied to a point where the setup required for the vulnerability
to be exploited very successfully is known, and situations which fix this vulnerability are
also known. Through exploration of a few such well documented examples, validation of
the algorithms’ scores can take place, and be discussed. Comparison of scores from all of
the compositing methods will be conducted in order to give comparative results based on
each approach.

6.1 Scenario One - Windows Systems Vulnerability

The first scenario which is considered is in the case of Windows operating system
vulnerability, allowing remote attackers to assault TCP port 135 with malformed packets.
This entry is listed under CVE-2006-3880 [32]. The topology for this experimental
scenario is shown in Figure 6.1. These malformed packets are sent constantly (as fast as
possible), and have random integers inserted into TCP headers, enabling the vulnerability
on the machines, as the machine attempts to process the headers. This vulnerability,
exploited on a network of computers running the Windows operating system can be
potentially isolated from the outside world through this exploit. The exploit causes a
denial-of-service on the client via an IP stack hang, making communication with the
affected machine not possible. All windows machines which have port 135 open, and
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have not been patched or upgraded to avoid this vulnerability are vulnerable to this
attack. In effect, this vulnerability affects all vulnerable Windows machines equally, with
no special relationship between the affected machines being created, though a critical
service machine affected with this attack may stop serving its clients due to being
unreachable, causing wide reaching issues, such as if the machine were a login-serving
system. Were a serving machine exploited with this vulnerability, more machines would
be affected, in that they would not be served their services by the machine since it is
effectively cut off of the network. For these tables indicating the network present, a dash
indicates no vulnerability present (such as the system only having one or zero
vulnerabilities).
Table 6.1: Experimental Scenario 1 Details
Client Name
M1
M2
M3
M4
M5
M6
M7
M8

Client Role
Server
Client
Client
Non-Client
Non-Client
Non-Client
Non-Client
Non-Client

Importance Level
3
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
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Vulnerability 1
5.0
5.0
5.0
2.1
1.2
1.2
-

Vulnerability 2
1.2
2.1
-

Figure 6.1: Experimental Scenario 1 Topology

The experimental setup for this experiment has several machines on the network
with the vulnerability, and other machines which are not vulnerable. The scores are
derived based upon applying the quantification framework that was written for this
research on the model network, and comparing the security health scores resulting from
the experiments. The situation involving the vulnerability, and then without the
vulnerability are tested, for comparison as well, in that the network should be more
vulnerable with the vulnerability than without it. The experimental results for this setup
are shown in Table 6.1.
Linear compositing on the above situation yields a score of 1.962500 for the
network, in that the scores are considered separately, with no correlation. The scores are
reduced a bit due to a quarter of the network machines being completely secure. The
average scores for the machines on the network is the resulting score, which reflects a
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generally secure network, which is the reality, in that the worst vulnerability is 5.0 and
the quantity of vulnerabilities is relatively low.
Weighted compositing yields a score of 4.581250, since the information about
which machines are especially critical due to their client server role, and being vulnerable
to the attack through the server being reflected in the weighting. The client is ranked as a
high importance member, with clients being medium importance, and the unrelated
network members being low importance. The score reflects several clients having a 5.0
vulnerability, but still there being a few clients with very few to no vulnerabilities
reduces the score a bit from the 5.0 of the experimental vulnerability.
The role-based compositing method yields a score of 7.056850, which more
appropriately reflects the network condition. The quantity of higher severity
vulnerabilities tips the score upwards. The larger vulnerabilities tend to help dominate the
scoring, and as their quantity increases in relation to the total number of network
members, they push the score upwards. The score reflects not only the importance of the
machines on the network, but also increases the score above the base score of each
machine, which reflects more realistically that the number of vulnerabilities on the
network, the more vulnerable it is. The other compositing methods do not really reflect
this. This method more accurately reflects the condition of the network with a score
higher than the base of 5.0 from the experimental vulnerability.
6.2 Scenario Two – Router Vulnerability

This experiment reflects CVE-2002-2159, which is a vulnerability on some
Linksys (Cisco) routers, which allows remote backdoor access to administration and
router control [33]. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to effectively control or
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shut down network traffic via any controls that the router has available. Perhaps most
severe is that the attacking agent may move clients to a “DMZ” role, meaning they are no
longer behind any sort of firewall, traffic control, etc., that the router might otherwise
provide. This exposes the selected client(s) to remote access from the wider network on
the outside of the router’s served network. Attackers might also gain critical information
about the clients through the router configurations, and the DHCP table, listing all clients
served on the network. This silent exploitation of the network allows backdoor access
until it is removed, which means a silent backdoor for agents exploiting this vulnerability,
which may not go noticed for a very long time. The router itself is of critical importance
on the network, and the clients served by the router are of medium vulnerability, in that
they stand to be potentially security probed by the outside network, or the attackers
manipulating the network via the router’s control. These clients may have local
protection such as application firewalls or antivirus applications which can protect them
from this exposure, but clients depending on the router for security will be completely
exposed by a savvy attacker exploiting this vulnerability. For this experiment we will
consider a network behind such a firewall, which exposes its clients to this potential
threat. The topology for this experimental scenario is shown in Figure 6.2. The
experimental setup for this scenario is as follows:

Table 6.2: Experimental Scenario 2 Details
Client Name
M1
M2
M3
M4
M5

Client Role
Router
Client
Client
Client
Client

Importance Level
3
2
2
2
2
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Vulnerability 1
8.0
4.3
1.2
4.3
5.0

Vulnerability 2
2.1
-

Figure 6.2: Experimental Scenario 2 Topology

This setup demonstrates a situation where all clients on the network are
potentially at risk due to a member of critical importance, with power over the other
clients being compromised. The importance of the router as a security asset, and the
critical nature of not allowing the router to be compromised, lends the importance of the
router to be much higher than that of the clients. Though the router is of high importance
through the vulnerability itself, the clients served by the router are also potentially at risk,
raising their vulnerability level as well. This situation is characteristic of a highly
vulnerable client-server interaction where the exploited server may compromise the
clients via information garnering or service control (such as traffic manipulation, or
denial of service). This situation is also important, in that the vulnerability is a quiet
backdoor which may be manipulated for long periods of time without being detected, in
that the backdoor is built into the code for the router’s software. The experimental results
for this setup are shown in Table 6.2.
Linear compositing gleans a score of 5.419800, weighted non-role based
compositing a score of 9.871254, and weighted role-based compositing a score of
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9.994886. Compositing with the linear approach yields the average, which does not fully
reflect the situation on the network, in that this score is less than the score of some of the
vulnerabilities. The score loses its accuracy through averaging everything, and
disregarding the frequency of appearance of the vulnerabilities so more vulnerabilities
may actually yield a smaller score than a single vulnerability. This is the case here, where
the total score across the machines is brought down from the 8.0 present on the router,
due to the lower scoring machines which are less vulnerable. This reflects the problem
with the linear compositing method. The weighted score is much more reasonable, in that
it recognizes the importance of certain members of the network over the others. The
router being so critical in this situation is recognized, and the severity of the problem, in
that it affects all members of the network potentially is recognized as well, pushing
scores up even more. The score is quite high via this realization, reflecting the severity of
the situation, and fixing this vulnerability being such a driving concern in order to secure
the network, which is at this point in the scenario, extremely vulnerable to this one
vulnerability. The role-based compositing method provides a score a bit higher than the
weighted compositing method, which reflects the quantity of scores present in the
network, which the weighted score does not. The number of vulnerabilities on the
machines raises the score a bit, since the more vulnerabilities, the more vulnerable the
network is, since there are more points of entry, and more ways to exploit the machines
on the network, via more vulnerabilities to exploit. These scores reflect a very vulnerable
network, since very high severity vulnerability is located on the most critical machine in
the network, and all clients on the network are served by the vulnerable machine, making
them vulnerable in turn. This is a very insecure situation, and the score reflects this.
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6.3 Scenario 3 – SQL Server Vulnerability

This vulnerability, which is CVE-2002-0649, is an exploitable vulnerability on
SQL servers, allowing data manipulation on the databases being served [34]. This
vulnerability can either cause denial of service on the server, or execution of inserted
code on the server. The inserted code can do arbitrary things on the server, such as
change rights, gain access to the machine, modify data stored in the databases, etc.,
making anyone served by these databases potentially at risk. Networks with SQL servers
and clients are vulnerable to this. The machines which are clients are vulnerable, but
quite so as the SQL server itself, and the non-clients present in the network, are for all
intents not made more vulnerable via this vulnerability being exploited. Due to these
roles, the SQL servers will be given a high importance, the clients a medium importance,
and the non-clients a low importance to reflect this. The topology for this experimental
scenario is shown in Figure 6.3. The experimental setup is as follows:
Table 6.3: Experimental Scenario 3 Details
Client Name
M1
M2
M3
M4
M5
M6

Client Role
Server
Client
Client
Non-Client
Non-Client
Non-Client

Importance Level
3
2
2
1
1
1
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Vulnerability 1
7.5
4.3
1.2
4.3
5.0
5.0

Vulnerability 2
2.1
-

Figure 6.3: Experimental Scenario 3 Topology

The experimental setup shows a SQL server with the vulnerability discussed
present on it. The machines which are listed as clients are the clients of this SQL server,
which are somewhat vulnerable due to the exploit possible on the SQL server serving
them. The machines which are not clients are not served, and are also not servers, making
them independent members on the network, and though their vulnerabilities are a
concern, they are not as vulnerable as the other machines, and do not contribute to the
large-scale exploit which is possible over the nodes involved in the SQL group. The
experimental results for this setup are shown in Table 6.3.
The linear compositing method provides a score of 5.2665, which is the average
of the machines on the network. The score, as with the other scenarios, does not reflect
the full situation on the network, in that it is blind to the importance of certain members
over others, and cares not that higher level vulnerabilities on machines makes the
network more vulnerable, but instead only shows that the average score on the network is
less than 5 for the given setup. The weighted compositing method yields a score of
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9.919534, which shows that the high importance of the critical member of the SQL server
is shown as highly important, and brings the score very close to the maximum score,
especially with the added scores of the medium importance clients to the SQL service.
The role-based compositing method yields a score just higher than the weighted score,
with a score of 9.963324. This score reflects that more vulnerable machines mean a
worse score, which escapes the scoring systems of the other techniques. This score is
more reflective of the severity of the situation, and again approaches the maximum score
of 10 very closely, in that the situation on the network is very severely vulnerable.

6.4 Real World Data – WKU’s Client Network
The techniques described were also applied to Western Kentucky University’s (WKU’s)
user client network, in order to test the system on a real network. Nmap was utilized to scan the
network and determine which ports were open on the client machines, and then the scan was
processed with the processing framework code. The scan showed 11762 online clients, with a
total of 262 vulnerabilities detected. WKU’s network is configured as a small group of routers,
all connected to one another through redundant links, and then from these routers, a structure of
switches serves the clients. This switch structure is a tree-shape with a main distribution switch
being the first step from the router, and the switches for each building or area being served by the
distribution switch. This building-wide switch then serves many switches within the building,
which in turn serve the clients. This structure can be called a small star-graph of routers with
trees of switches 3 or 4 layers deep extending from the router network.The worst of these was an
8.0 vulnerability score. No machine was detected with more than one vulnerability, so the
maximal client score was an 8.0. The composite network score garnered was a 5.061171 via
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linear compositing, an 8.02572 via weighted non-role based compositing, and an 8.57161 via
weighted role-based compositing, noting a few machines which are known administrator
machines on the network as medium priority. These scores seem to accurately reflect the health
of the network, with a machine score of 8.0 present, and many clients with some vulnerability
present on it. With more information about critical machines a more accurate score might be
possible.
Table 6.4: Experimental Scores Table
Experiment

Linear Compositing

Scenario 1
Scenario 2
Scenario 3
WKU Data

1.9625
5.4198
5.2665
5.061171
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Weighted Non-Role
Based Compositing
4.58125
9.871254
9.19534
8.02572

Weighted RoleBased Compositing
7.05685
9.994886
9.963324
8.57161

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

In this section of the thesis, discussion of the efficacy of the methods employed to
quantify the network and achieve the goals the thesis set out to achieve are conducted.
The various methods employed to achieve this goal of reducing the complexity of the
network health report is used, and the approach is discussed as well. Future work which
goes beyond this thesis is mentioned, in that more work can be done regarding this goal
and extending its functionality.

7.1 Efficacy of Methods of Composition

The methods utilized to composite the scores for the individual machines on the
network are discussed here in order to discuss what has been determined about
shortcomings or strengths in the methods utilized. These methods each have their own
instinctive reasoning behind creating them, and under analysis perform differently. The
performance experienced under experimentation, and the observed behavior under
different situations is discussed.

7.1.1 Linear Compositing

Linear compositing is the most straight-forward of the approaches, and the
simplest form of composition experimented with in this thesis. The average gives a very
intuitive value for the health of the network, in that the total health of the network
perhaps appears to be the average health of all its members. This approach does not take
into account any of the extra information which is utilized in the more role-based
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compositing methods. The end result of linear compositing is an average score, which
intuitively seems to be a rational scoring method, but in practice breaks down quickly.
The main issue with this method is that it simply does not reflect the security level on the
network accurately, in that the more vulnerable clients present, the more severe the
security threat to the network. With this method, the more vulnerable clients, potentially
the more secure the network, if the averaging process is processing many low-severity
threat clients, and one severe level threat. This would erode the high score garnered by
the severe case, and result in a lower score for the entire network, which does not
represent the situation accurately, since the more vulnerable clients, the more severe the
network security threat. The average security level of each host is what the linear
composite gives, which is not precisely what is wanted in this case, in that more
information is known about the network situation, and this information will garner a
better idea of the network health situation than this simple method.

7.1.2 Weighted Compositing

The weighted compositing method allows for a more accurate picture to be drawn
of the network, via each client contributing to the final score. This is effective, in that it
allows the clients to each contribute to the final score without drawing down the final
score with lower composite scores from more secure clients. This method more reflects
the reality that the more vulnerable machines the more insecure the network is, even if
the machines outnumber the more insecure individual clients. This method greatly
increases the accuracy of the scoring for the system, with only the role-based compositing
providing a more accurate indication of network health.
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7.1.3 Weighted Role-Based Compositing

Weighted role-based compositing allows the compositing method to take in
account more information known about the network situation, such as if a router or
server, or its clients are vulnerable due to a particularly vulnerable client, and such
situations as special application on particular machines controlling administrator access
for example, can be modeled. Through control of the weights of the members of the
network, precise control can be applied to the members of the network, allowing finecontrol of the network scenario on which the network quantification will be applied.
Information about the network scenario known by network administrators can be used to
adapt the model to more accurately reflect the network situation. This allows the method
to be much more accurate in determining the severity of the network situation than the
linear approach, raising the severity considerably whenever a situation which is made
worse via certain members being of higher importance occurs. The method brings out
much more information and a much more accurate score than the linear approach. This
method can be made as accurate as the information about the importance of the individual
members is understood and this information input into the system. Even with a mild
understanding of the most critical network members, the compositing method works
better than any other method tested.
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7.2 Efficacy of Approach

The approach of trying to reduce the complexity of network reports into a single
double value is an interesting question. The approach attempts to go nearly as far as one
can go in terms of simplifying the value. A decimal value is much more efficient to
understand, interpret, and otherwise handle than a large network report, but inevitably,
some data will be lost about the specifics of the network situation. Through compositing
down to such a level quantification is achieved though, which enables mathematical
analysis of the network health, as opposed to reports which are merely a collection of
data not so easily interpreted. This attempt at interpreting the information down to a
single health score enables the ease of analysis and handling, but perhaps is not as
detailed a reporting factor than other methods of network condition analysis, but the
system cannot be asked to be. Ease of interpretation and simplification are the strong
suits of this system, and were the goals that drove the research, so in that respect this
system achieves its goals. Full analysis of the data can occur at the report generation
level, but for large scale analysis where data complexity reduction, or quantification is
desired, this system achieves what is not achieved via other systems.

7.3 Future Work

Additional work is possible with this system in order to enhance the accuracy of
the system. Work relating to expanding the method for interpretation of the
vulnerabilities to incorporate things such as expanded definitions for vulnerability
signatures would enhance the detection of vulnerabilities. This work would enhance the
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network situation identification via expanding the ability of the program to detect NVD
and CVE vulnerabilities through matching other things such as detection of machine
operating system, probing vulnerabilities, and other advanced vulnerability detection
techniques utilized by larger scale network scanners. Any way to increase the accuracy of
the network scenario which is interpreted for the quantification would enhance the
accuracy of the score generated by the system.
In addition to increasing the accuracy of the scan to bring in more of the
vulnerabilities present in the network, the system may be improved via more analysis of
the interaction of the elements in the network. The current system does not take into
account the situation of the network fully as it might were things like attack graphs
considered for determining exactly how vulnerable certain machines are in consideration
with other machines which are not so vulnerable due to the attack graph being longer or
more indirect. This type of analysis would add another layer of accuracy to the value,
enhancing the result.
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